26 JANUARY 2026
PRESS STATEMENT
In recent years, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) has faced growing public criticism and declining trust due to its perceived ineffectiveness in addressing grand corruption. Concerns over selective prosecution have further undermined confidence, particularly given that the MACC Chief Commissioner is effectively appointed by the Prime Minister through his binding advice to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. This institutional arrangement creates an inherent conflict of interest when investigations involve the Prime Minister or their close political and personal associates.
Despite the severity of this problem, since its inception in 2009, no major reform of the MACC has been instituted by any government. On the contrary, statements by the MACC itself point to deep-seated institutional resistance to reform. In recent years, separate calls to place the MACC under independent oversight have been met with vehement rejection by the MACC and its Chief Commissioner, Azam Baki. Instead, the Commission has consistently insisted that it is fully independent and already subject to robust “check-and-balance mechanisms” that ensure accountability.
In particular, defenders have pointed to the existence tasked with the MACC’s operations, as follows:
- The Anti-Corruption Advisory Body (ACAB);
- The Special Committee on Corruption (SCC);
- The Complaints Committee (CC);
- The Operations Review Panel (ORP); and
- The Consultation and Corruption Prevention Panel (CCPP).
But do these accountability frameworks actually work?
Through the launch of our latest report, the Center to Combat Corruption and Cronyism (C4 Center) examines the effectiveness of the MACC’s check-and-balance mechanisms and highlights major structural weaknesses that reveal severe limitations of accountability and oversight for the MACC. Examination of the functions and the composition of each body together with a review of international best practice reveals a number of key findings, namely:
- The existence of multiple oversight bodies does not equate to meaningful accountability;
- Oversight activity relating to the MACC is largely opaque and occurs behind closed doors;
- The MACC is not meaningfully required to respond to or justify its position on oversight findings;
- None of the five oversight bodies possess powers to investigate misconduct, compel evidence, or impose consequences;
- The Prime Minister exercises decisive control over appointments to the MACC, its oversight bodies, and the Attorney General’s office;
- Appointment criteria for oversight bodies are vague and subjective, enabling discretionary selection; and
- Oversight responsibility is fragmented across multiple weakly empowered bodies, allowing institutional buck-passing.
Describing these five organisations as “oversight bodies” is misleading, each body only holds advisory functions, with the implementation of this advice being at the sole discretion of the MACC. Throughout the course of this research, several major cases have stood out in further highlighting significant failures and limitations in the MACC oversight bodies, in particular:
- Teoh Beng Hock’s death in MACC custody (2009): Despite separate findings by the Human Rights Commission, a Royal Commission of Inquiry and a Court of Appeal judgement highlighting numerous instances of misconduct and even abuse perpetrated by MACC officers, not a single individual has been successfully charged for their role in his death;
- The 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) Scandal (2015): Less than a year after the alleged misappropriation of RM2.6 billion by Prime Minister Najib Razak was exposed, newly-appointed Attorney General Apandi Ali would clear him of all wrongdoing. Shortly after, the MACC would refer this case to the ORP. Apandi would respond by saying that, “any bodies formed to question any decision of the AG would be against Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution”;
- Azam Baki’s shareholding scandal (2021): Exposés by an investigative journalist alleged Azam Baki’s involvement in the purchase of millions of shares in a company, directly contravening various public service regulations. Even with serious allegations tainting his reputation, his term as Chief Commissioner has been renewed three consecutive times;
- The ignoring of the SCC’s 2020 annual report (2022): Despite, obligations under Section 14 of the MACC Act 2009 requiring the Prime Minister to present the SCC’s report to Parliament, the 2020 version – which was only published in 2022 – along with its numerous recommendations have not been laid before Parliament; and
- Syed Saddiq’s corruption trial (2025): The Court of Appeal judgement that eventually acquitted Syed Saddiq of his corruption charges, also called attention to three instances of abuse and intimidation of witnesses by MACC officers.
With hopes to address the numerous issues illustrated throughout the report, C4 Center recommends the following:
- Expanding Ombudsman Malaysia’s jurisdiction to include the MACC, enabling an independent body with investigatory powers to handle complaints of maladministration and misconduct within the Commission;
- Establishing a Parliamentary Special Select Committee dedicated to overseeing the MACC, with powers to summon witnesses, request documents, and oversee the appointment and removal of the Chief Commissioner;
- Reframing the ACAB, ORP, and CCPP as advisory or support bodies with strengthened transparency obligations, while relocating true oversight functions to Parliament and the Ombudsman; and
- Separating the offices of the Attorney General and Public Prosecutor, with an independent Public Prosecutor appointed through a non-executive-dominated process and governed by clear prosecutorial guidelines.
The recent Sabah Corruption Scandal and the MACC’s subsequent treatment of Albert Tei has further exposed deep-rooted issues of accountability that continue to tarnish the commission’s public perception. It is apparent that – other than instituting a lawsuit against the MACC – Tei would have no avenue for recourse, even if the MACC had been proven to have mistreated him. Here, C4 Center stresses that the exercise of the MACC’s powers must be accountable to an independent party, and that any complaints mechanism against the commission must be made publicly available.
END OF STATEMENT
Issued by:
Center to Combat Corruption & Cronyism (C4 Center)
For further enquiries, please contact:
c4center@gmail.com
